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TIHE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION UNDER
"ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS":
DESIGN FOR PROSPERITY OR RECIPE
FOR DISASTER?
I. INTRODUCTION
After almost a century and a half of British rule; the Crown Colony
of Hong Kong will return to Chinese rule at midnight on June 30, 1997
to become a Special Administrative Region ("SAR") of the People's
Republic of China ("PRC"). The return of sovereignty will be a novel
experiment2 under the scheme of "one country, two systems," 3 in which
the SAR will be allowed to remain as a pocket of capitalism with a high
degree of autonomy in the PRC's socialist system for fifty years.4
This Note -will assess the probable success or failure of the "ore
country, two systems" scheme. Additionally, this Note will consider the
history and the possible future of Hong Kong through an examination of
the relevant legal documents that have governed and those that will guide
the lives of nearly six million Hong Kong citizens. The conflicts and
tensions inherent in the unification of the two seemingly incompatible
1. The Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Question of Hong Kong,
Sept. 26, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.20 (Cmd.9352) reprinted in THE
HONG KONG BASIC LAw, BLUEPRINT FOR 'STABILITY AND PROSPERITY' UNDER CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY? 259 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
2. Albert H. Y. Chen, From Colony to Special Administrative Region: Hong Kong's
Constitutional Journey, in THE FTuRE OF THE LAW IN HONG KONG 76, 102 (Raymond
Wacks ed., 1989) ("The problem of Hong Kong knows no historical precedent. In
groping for answers, everyone is a novice.").
3. Expressed as yige guofia, liangge zhidu or yigou liangzhi.
4. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic Of China art. 5 [hereinafter Basic Law] (adopted on Apr. 4, 1990 by the Seventh
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China). See generally Raymond
Wacks, Introduction, in THE FUTUImE OF THE LAW IN HONG KONG (Raymond Wacks ed.,
1989).
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systems, as well as suggestions to ease this tension to safeguard
prosperity, will also be discussed.
II. TnE BEGINNINGS OF HONG KONG
The British empire aggressively exported opium to China during the
1830s.- Resistance by Chinese officials to the opium trade sparked the
retaliation of the British in what was to become known as the Opium War
of 1839-42." The victorious British forced the Chinese Government to
cede Hong Kong Island in perpetuity under the 1842 Treaty of Nanking.7
Sixteen years later, hostilities arising from the attempts to open Canton
(Guangzhou) to foreign trade culminated in the attack of Peking by an
Anglo-French expedition." In the 1860 Treaty of Peking, China was
forced to cede the Kowloon peninsula, which is directly across from the
Hong Kong Island.' Finally, in 1898, Britain took advantage of China's
weakness and forced China to "lease" a larger area north of Kowloon,
which was physically connected to the Mainland. This area became
known as the New Territories. The "lease " " made no provisions for the
payment of rent and was to last for ninety-nine years," that is, until
5. Shawn B. Jensen, International Agreements Between the United States and Hong
Kong, 7 TEMP. INT. & CoiP. L.J. 167, 168 (1993).
6. Hungdah Chiu, Introduction, 20 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988).
7. Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, Gr. Brit.-P.R.C., art. HI, 93 Consol. T.S. 465,
467.
8. Terry Cunnew, Hong Kong: Estates Gazette Focus on Hong Kong, Reuter Textline
Est. Gazette, Nov. 12, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, TZPRIM File.
9. Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, Or. Brit.-P.R.C., art. VI, 123 Consol.
T.S. 71, 73-74.
10. Convention of Peking Respecting the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9,
1898, Gr. Brit.-P.R.C., reprinted in THE GovERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG
246-247.
11. English legal thought at the time probably intended ninety-nine years as being "in
perpetuity"; however, the fact that the lease expires is probably irrelevant to the question
of return of sovereignty of Hong Kong, given China's bargaining power in recent years.
Furthermore, no serious thought is ever given to returning the New Territories to China
and retaining the ceded parts of the Colony, as the tiny, overpopulated ceded part can
never survive on its own today. See Wendy Dullea Bowie, The Effect of the 7iananmen
Square Massacre upon Negotiations for the Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Adminisative Region, 8 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 245, 249 (1990).
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1997.12 The Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New
Territories collectively constitute the territory of Hong Kong.
The Crown Colony, which was at the time little more than some
farmland and a barren, rocky island off the southern coast of China, saw
its beginning as a strategic outpost for the British to expand its interests
into China.1 3
III. THE CONsTrITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF HONG KONG
AS A BRTIS CROWN COLONY
British colonies acquired during the Empire's expansionist stage can
typically be classified according to the manner by which they were
acquired: either colonies settled by British subjects in territories where
there was no population or organized society or colonies acquired by
conquest or cessation."' Hong Kong falls into the second category. '5
From the outset, elaborate rules governing the distribution of power and
the structure of the local government were mandated by London. 6 The
constitutional structure was defined in prerogative legislative instruments
issued by the Crown: Orders in Council, the Letters Patent, and the Royal
Instructions. 7 These instruments mandate that London, through the
Governor, retain overwhelming powers of control over the Colonial
government. " Surprisingly, this structure saw little significant change and
was still largely in force until a certain degree of democratization began
to take place in the early 1980s."9
12. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at Annex III.
13. G.B. ENDACOIT, A ISTORY OF HONG KONG 39 (2d ed. 1973)
14. Chen, supra note 2, at 76.
15. Id. at 77; see also Andrew Dicks, Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some
Legal Aspects of the Status of Hong Kong, 95 CHiNA Q. 427 (1983); Basic Law, supra
note 4, art. 40 (wherein the rights of the indigenous inhabitants of the New Territories are
recognized and protected to this day and beyond 1997).
16. Chen, supra note 2, at 77, 79.
17. Id. at 77.
18. For example, the chief executive, known as the Governor, is appointed directly by
London. The legislature, known as the Legislative Council, is primarily advisory in
nature. Id. at 77-78.
19. Id. Changes include the implementation of consultation bodies called "district
boards" at the local district level. Id; see also Nihal Jayawickrama, Economic, Social and
Cultural Aspect, in THE BAsic LAW AND HONG KONG'S FuTuRE 231, 234 (Albert Chen
& Peter Wesley-Smith eds., 1988) (comparing the stage of constitutional development of
Hong Kong today to that of Ceylon in 1910).
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Although notions of representative and democratic government are
still largely absent, the Hong Kong system has reflected British legal
principles that are based on the Rule of Law,10 not arbitrary rule. This
has allowed the government to evolve into a "paternalistic, benevolent
bureaucracy,"21 not just for the British nationals residing in Hong Kong,
but also for the growing Chinese population in the territory.
By the 1980s, Hong Kong had become something quite unique in the
world-a contemporary metropolis ranking among the top in the world in
many of its financial achievements2-yet its people had never known any
real political democracy. Although the idea of a British colonial
government ruling over a population which is 98 per cent Chinesep may
carry with it notions of oppression, the Hong Kong people had for over
a century overwhelmingly accepted the government as legitimate.' Save
for a few episodes in its history,' there had been no demand from the
local populace for representative government, for independence, or for a
return to China.' Instead, the distinctive society has largely focused its
attention on the pursuit of economic ends. Although in recent years a
limited degree of democracy has been introduced and greater attention is
now focused on the rights of Hong Kong residents, the general apathy of
the population towards self-government27 makes Hong Kong ill-equipped
to protect its own rights when the British flag is lowered.
What is important in the study of the future of Hong Kong is not that
British rule will be thrown out, but what part of British rule will remain.
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China "Basic Law", which is to become the supreme
law for the post-1997 Hong Kong SAR, will preserve, basically
20. Peter Wesley-Smith, The Present Constitution of Hong Kong, in THE BASIc LAW
AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 6 (Albert Chen & Peter Wesley-Smith eds., 1988).
21. Nihal Jayawickrama, The Basic Law and Hwnan Rights, 2(4) L. SoC'Y HONG
KONG GAZETTE 22 (Aug. 1988).
22. See generally HONG KONG 1990 (David Roberts ed., 1991).
23. Chen, supra note 2, at 92.
24. Id.
25. There were only three large scale riots in Hong Kong after the Second World War.
The most serious, in 1967, was instigated by local communists influenced by the Cultural
Revolution in China at the time. The small group of communists in Hong Kong, with the
support of the CCP, demanded the Colony be returned to Chinese rule immediately. The
movement did not gain wide support. See Chen, supra note 2, at 82-83.
26. Id. at 92.
27. Siu-Kai Lau, The Political Values of the Hong Kong Otinese, in THE BASIC LAW
AND HONG KONG'S FuruRE 19, 21-23 (Albert Chen & Peter Wesley-Smith eds., 1988).
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unchanged, the common law legal system." How Western views of the
common law might be influenced by Chinese legal thought and politics
will be examined further below.
IV. CHINESE PoLicY TowARDs THE
QuEsTION OF HONG KONG
The Chinese have always viewed the three treaties through which
Great Britain gained sovereignty over Hong Kong as "unequal treaties.""
This dogma of "losing face" has haunted the Chinese through three
successive regimes and continues to this day to influence the Chinese
attitude towards its handling of Hong Kong matters.30
The Ching Dynasty, with which the British signed the original
treaties, was overthrown by the Chinese Nationalist Party ("CNP") in
1911. The CNP formed the Republic of China ("ROC") government
thereafter. There were attempts to recover the Colony during the Second
World War, but the issue of the leased territories was dropped by the
ROC government in favor of inducing the British to agree to give up
extraterritorial and special rights in China.31 In 1949, the ROC
government was defeated by Communist forces and was forced to flee and
re-establish itself in Taiwan. Since fleeing Mainland China and re-
establishing itself in Taiwan, the ROC government has not been in a
position to negotiate the problem of Hong Kong. The People's Republic
of China ("PRC") was formed under Chinese Communist Party ("CCP")
rule.
Although the PRC government has a strong nationalistic,
revolutionary, and anti-imperialistic policy,32 it has been willing to
28. "The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of
equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except
for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 8; see also
Denis Chang, In Search of Pragmatic Solutions, in THE BASIC LAw AND HONG KONG'S
FUTURE 271, 275 (Albert Chen & Peter Wesley-Smith eds., 1988).
29. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 249.
30. See Defeat with Grace, S. CHINA MORNMNG POST, Sept. 25, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
31. Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China and the
Regulation of Related Matters, Chung King, Jan. 11, 1943, U.K.-China 1943 Or. Brit.
T.S. No.2.
32. Chiu, supra note 6, at 2; see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution
of the People's Republic of China] (1982), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Beijing, Foreign Language Press ed., 1983), Preamble
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maintain the status quo on Hong Kong." When it declared its intention
in 1984 to resume sovereignty over the territory, it devised the plan of
"one country, two systems," which it believed would promote confidence
in the future of Hong Kong and help to maintain stability and prosperity
in the territory. The scheme would allow the capitalist system to continue,
even after Hong Kong becomes a part of Communist China.
The PRC has an important stake in maintaining the prosperity of
Hong Kong because it generates a substantial amount of foreign exchange
for the PRC through its re-export of Chinese products. Hong Kong has
also been an outlet for Chinese political dissidents and serves to reduce the
political tension on the Mainland.' Hong Kong also remains the indirect
tie with Taiwan for trade and mall. It was due largely to the wish of the
PRC government to re-absorb Taiwan that the idea of "one country, two
systems" first arose. 3" The wish for unification with Taiwan will remain
an important motivation for the PRC to maintain the stability and
prosperity of Hong Kong, in order to attract the ROC government to agree
to integrate with the Mainland.36
Undoubtedly, the future success or failure of Hong Kong will be
largely dependant on the actions of the PRC government. In any study of
the future of Hong Kong, one must begin with the assumption that China
[hereinafter PRC CONSTrrUTION].
33. But see supra note 23.
34. This reduction of tension is an important function that would invariably will be lost
if not greatly reduced in the future. The population of Hong Kong grew by leaps and
bounds during periods of unrest in China. It would be a simple matter for the PRC
government to demand return of its dissidents, but it has instead chosen to turn mostly a
blind eye. David A. Jones, Jr., Note, A Leg to Stand On? Post-1997Hong Kong Courts
as a Constraint on PRC Abridgement of Individual Rights and Local Autonomy, 12 YALE
J. INT'L L. 250, 252 (1987).
35. The idea was first enumerated by Deng Xiaoping in 1982. Edward J. Epstein,
Odna and Hong Kong: Law, Ideology, and the Future Interaction of the Legal Systems,
in THE FuTURE OF THE LAW IN HONo KONG 37, 49 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989). See
also Denis Chang, Towards a Jurisprudence of a Third Kind: 'One Country, Two
Systems, " 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 99, 100 (1988).
36. Michael C. Davis, A Common Law Court in a Marxist Country: The Case for
Judicial Review in The Hong Kong SAR, 16 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1987). For
its part, the ROC government has resisted talks with the PRC government on re-
unification. Taiwan's government has denounced the Joint Declaration as invalid. For
a discussion of the relevance of the Hong Kong problem to Taiwan, see Byron S. J.
Weng, The Hong Kong Model of 'One Country, Two Systems'. Promises and Problems,
in The Basic Law and Hong Kong's Future 73, 84-88 (Albert Chen & Peter Wesley-
Smith eds., 1988).
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is sincere about maintaining and furthering the prosperity of Hong Kong."
There are very compelling reasons for keeping Hong Kong prosperous,
and the CCP has been willing to re-examine its socialist doctrines to
justify the re-union under the scheme of "one country, two systems."3
In one such area, the international scene, the PRC has been unwilling
to acknowledge that the issue of Hong Kong falls under the jurisdiction of
the United Nations. On March 8, 1972, the Permanent Representative of
China to the United Nations sent a lettter to the Chairman of the Special
Committee on Decolonization, asserting that the problem of Hong Kong
was a local matter entirely within China's sovereign right.39 There were
no protests from Britain or the Committee. The future of Hong Kong has
been allowed to proceed contrary to global trends of de-colonization as
required by the United Nations charter.' Instead of evolving from a
colony of the United Kingdom (UK) into a self-governing territory, it is
turning into a "colony" of the PRC.4'
V. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND
Tl PRC GOvRENS
In 1982, the British government, seeing the impending end of the
1898 "lease," sought to open negotiations with the PRC government to
37. Chen, supra note 2, at 106.
38. Chang, supra note 35, at 104; see also Epstein, supra note 35, at 49-51.
39. Nihal Jayawickrama, Drafting a Bill of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG
37 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1992).
40. Members of the United Nations which have or assume
responsibilities for the admimstratdon of territories whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize
the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories
are paramount... ,and to this end... develop self-government,
to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and
to assist them in the progressive development of their free political
institutions ....
U.N. Charter art. 73 (emphasis added); see also Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961); see generally Jones, supra note
34, at 256-63.
41. Iayawickrama, supra note 39, at 64 (calling the denial of self-determination for the
Hong Kong people a violation of what is a peremptory norm of contemporary
international law). For an account of the decolonization of Britain's other colonies, see
Norman Miners, The Normal Pattern of Decolonisa'on of British Dependent Territories,
in THE BAsIc LAW AND HONG KoNG'S FUTURE 44 (Albert Chen & Peter Wesley-Smith
eds., 1988).
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secure its interests in Hong Kong. The British Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher, went to Peking (Beijing) and met with Premier Zhao Ziyang and
Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, Deng Xiaopeng. China
insisted on regaining the sovereignty of Hong Kong but promised that it
would take steps to ensure its prosperity. 42 The British stressed the
importance of maintaining its ties with Hong Kong if Hong Kong were to
retain its global importance.' 3 At the end of Thatcher's visit, a joint
communique was issued stating that both countries "agreed to enter talks
through diplomatic channels... with the common aim of maintaining the
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.""
The precise details of the closed negotiations that followed remain
largely unknown.4 The Hong Kong people were neither a party to nor
consultants in the discussions," and many of the Hong Kong people felt
that they were sold short by the British in their time of need. These
feelings contributed greatly to the general apathy towards politics; the
people felt that what was done was done. Land values, stock prices and
the Hong Kong dollar plunged dramatically which called for drastic
measures to stabilize the economy.' 7 This episode demonstrates just how
fragile the Hong Kong economy can be and how important the people's
confidence is to maintaining stability in Hong Kong.
Finally, after two years of hard negotiations, the United Kingdom and
the PRC came to an agreement which was formally ratified in the Joint
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong."
42. Chiu, supra note 6, at 2.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id.
45. Under §2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, the right to official information is
almost non-existent. This British Act applies to Hong Kong by Order in Council.
Johannes Chan, Protection of CiI Liberties, in THE BASIc LAw AND HONG KONG'S
FUTURE 196, 205 (Albert Chen & Peter Wesley Smith eds., 1988).
46. The United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concern over this matter
when it met in November 1988 to examine the Hong Kong report. Nihal Jayawickrama,
Protecting Cvil Liberties, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAw IN HONG KONG 148, 155-57
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1989).
47. The HK dollar, which lost at least half of its value, was pegged to the US dollar
at 1:7.8. See HONG KONG 1990, supra note 22, at 78.
48. Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
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VI. THE JOINT DECLARATION
The Joint Declaration, which contains more than 8,000 words, spells
out in detail the PRC's policy towards Hong Kong. The highlights of the
declaration are as follows: 49
1. The sovereignty of Hong Kong will return to China. It will
become a Special Administrative Region of the PRC under article 31 of
the PRC's Constitution,50 and "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy
5 t
except in foreign and defense affairs .... ",2
2. The capitalist economic and trade systems will remain in place for
fifty years after 1997. s" The socialist systems and policies of the PRC will
not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HK
SAR); 54
3. Hong Kong "will be vested with executive, legislative, and
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication";
55
4. The existing social system will remain unchanged. Freedom of
speech, of movement, of the press, of assembly, to strike, of religion, of
private property, and other freedoms will be protected by law.-
5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") promulgated by the UN, to which China is not a signatory, 7
will remain applicable to Hong Kong;"8
49. Chiu, supra note 6, at 5; see also Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 252-53;
Promises, Promises, Promises .... ECONOMIST, May 11, 1985, at 6..
50. "The State may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The
systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted
by the National People's Congress in light of the specific conditions." PRC
CONSTrTUTION, supra note 32, art. 31; see also id. art. 62 (13).
51. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, I 1-3(2).
52. Id.
53. Id. 3(5); id. Annex I, § L
54. Id. Annex ,§I, 1.
55. Id. 3(2)-(3); id. Annex I, § I.
56. Id. 3(5).
57. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 253.
58. Id. With the issuing of the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong residents and scholars
became aware that the ICCPR was already applicable to Hong Kong. When the United
Kingdom ratified the Covenant in 1976, it automatically became applicable to all
dependent UK territories as well. The UK government, in a report to the UN Human
Rights Committee in 1988, admitted that it did inform the people of Hong Kong of their
rights under the Covenant. Jayawickrama, supra note 39, at 37.
1994]
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6. The National People's Congress of the PRC will enact a Basic Law
to implement the Joint Declaration in accordance with the Constitution of
the PRC;59 and
7. The laws previously in force in Hong Kong will be maintained
except where they contradict the Basic Law.'
As provided by the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law would flesh out
the vague provisions of the Joint Declaration and become the supreme law
for the HK SAR.61
However, the Joint Declaration has, in the years after its signing, lost
a significant amount of importance. Although it is an international
agreement,62 fully ratified by both countries," it "is more an
announcement of intention rather than a binding treaty with clear
obligations that the parties must perform."" Furthermore, the document
is primarily a unilateral declaration of policy by the PRC.' As the
interests of the UK in Hong Kong slowly diminish,' the British
government will be in no position to help the people of Hong Kong,
should Beijing renege on its promises.67
VII. DRAFTiNG THE BASIC LAW
The PRC government controlled the drafting of the Basic Law of the
HK SAR from the outset; this control was provided for by the Joint
Declaration." The PRC government employed an elaborate system,
embodying both a Basic Law Drafting Committee 9 ("BLDC") and a
59. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, 3(12); see id. at Annex I.
60. Id. Annex 1, § H, 1.
61. Id. Annex 1, §§ 1, 11.
62. Joseph Y. S. Cheng, The Constitutional Relationsup Between the Central
Government and the Future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 20
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 65, 73 (1988).
63. Joint Declaration, supra note 1 (ratified Dec. 19, 1984).
64. Weng, supra note 36, at 77.
65. Id.
66. Jardines, the largest British conglomerate, was among the first Hong Kong
companies to re-locate its headquarters to Bermuda.
67. Weng, supra note 36, at 77. But see Cheng, supra note 62, at 73.
68. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
69. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 255. "The BLDC consist[s] of 40 Chinese
members appointed by the PRC government and 23 Hong Kong members selected by the
initial 40 Chinese members." Id. (quoting Jackson, The Legal Regime ofHong Kong After
1997: An Examination of the Joint Declaration of the United Kingdom and the People's
[Vol. 15
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Consultative Committee.7" The BLDC was made up of members from
China and members appointed by the PRC government from Hong Kong.
Both committees also set up working groups to tackle various topic areas
of the Basic Law. 71 The process was intended to provide consultation with
a cross-section of the Hong Kong populace.' However, it soon became
obvious that the Hong Kong representatives on the BLDC functioned as
little more than tokens because the PRC government could remove them
at will when they were considered to be politically unsuitable.'
Concurrent with the drafting process were campaigns for and against
the development of a democratic, representative government in pre-1997
Hong Kong.' The Joint Declaration provided for the Hong Kong
Legislature to be fully elected after 1997. 75 The Chinese authorities
interpreted this provision as allowing for many types of electoral
arrangements,76 the least acceptable one to the PRC being universal
franchise and direct elections.' This interpretation sparked many
Republic of China, 5 Int'l Tax & Bus. L. 379, 380 (1987)). The members are chosen,
of course, for their pro-PRC views. Furthermore, "[t]he ratio of Chinese and Hong Kong
members makes it likely that PRC views will prevail." Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at
255.
70. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11. The Hong Kong public, fearful that the Chinese
view would dominate in the drafting process, insisted that they be allowed to participate.
Id. As a result, 180 residents were selected in 1985 from a cross-section of the
community to act as liaison between the BLDC and the Hong Kong people. Id.
71. Michael C. Davis, Where Two Legal Systems Collide: An Amenrican Constitutional
Scholar in Hong Kong, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 127 n.1 (1988) (The BLDC had six
sub-groups: (1) economic system, (2) rights and duties of the HK inhabitants, (3) culture,
technology, education and religion, (4) political structure of the SAR, (5) relationship
between the Central Government and the SAR, and (6) law. The Consultative Committee
for the Basic Law had eight subgroups: (1) political structure of the SAR, (2) the structure
of the Basic Law, (3) law, (4) inhabitants' and other persons' rights, freedom, welfare,
and duties, (5) finance, business, and economy, (6) culture, technology, education, and
religion, (7) external affairs, and (8) the relationship between the Central Government and
the SAR).
72. Davis, supra note at 36, at 2.
73. Ming K. Chan, Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong
Basic Law, 1985-90, in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR 'STABILITY AND
PROSPERITY' UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 3, 9 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds.,
1991).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10.
76. See id. at 13-17, for a discussion of the models for implementation of elections
proposed by both sides of the debate.
77. Id. at 3.
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confrontations between the supporters of the pro-democracy movement in
Hong Kong and the PRC's local establishment, the New China News
Agency ("NCNA"), Hong Kong branch. 7' The PRC wanted, and still
wants, a stable and prosperous Hong Kong under its rule, not a runaway
Hong Kong that may become anti-Communist." It soon became clear that
the PRC establishment, in its determination to pre-empt any local push
towards implementation of direct elections, destroyed any pretense of a
fair, open, and proper drafting procedure.80 This discrimination, coupled
with the inability of the British to stop interference by the Chinese even
before the take-over,"1 led to wide-spread disillusionment in the populace.
While the Basic Law was being drafted, the PRC's efforts to suppress
the drive for democracy in Hong Kong found an even more brutal
expression on the Mainland. The events of May and June 1989 help to
highlight the tensions inherent in the upcoming reunification. The Hong
Kong people have been, from the beginning, very attentive to
developments in the student movement in China. s2 The population of
Hong Kong voiced their strong support for the protesters, 3 realizing that
their own fate was inevitably linked to the Mainland." Almost overnight,
many people in Hong Kong were transformed from being apolitical to
being committed to the fight for their own freedoms.' 5 On May 21, 1989,
one million people took to the streets of Hong Kong in support of the
student protest in Tianannien Square in Beijing, followed by another march
of one and one-half million people on May 28, 1989.86 When the military
78. Id. at 7-8.
79. Weng, supra note 36, at 81. Both during and after the pro-democracy uprising,
Beijing has continuously warned Hong Kong that it will not allow it to become a "base
for counter-revolutionary subversion." See, e.g., Hong Kong Law Drafting Team Arrives
in Peking, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 1989.
80. Chan, supra note 73, at 15.
81. Id. at 10. On May 27, 1987, the Hong Kong government issued its policy decision
on limited democratization leading up to 1997 in the Green Paper entitled The 1987
Review ofDevelopments in Representative Government. The PRC authorities immediately
expressed their opposition to direct elections and castigated the British attempt to develop
representative government in Hong Kong before 1997 as a violation of the Joint
Declaration.
82. Id. at 17.
83. John Greenwald, Next Door and Eight Years Away: Hong Kong Demands Greater
Freedom from OChna-and Itself, TIME, June 5, 1989, at 29.
84. Chan, supra note 73, at 17.
85. Id. at 17-18; see also Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 247-48.
86. Chan, supra note 73, at 18.
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crackdown on the protesters was finally ordered on June 4, for many in
Hong Kong, the action was the last straw. The crackdown resulted in
widespread distrust, even hostility, towards the Chinese leadership.87 The
Hong Kong people could only wonder about their own fate after
reunification, and about the degree of faith they could place in China's
promises.'8
In the year that followed, the UK government rushed to restore
confidence in the territory, 9 but it appeared that the scars ran too deep for
any miracle cures. When the Basic Law was finally promulgated by the
National People's Congress ("NPC") on April 4, 1990, it was greeted
with indifference or by bitter denunciations from many Hong Kong
people." There was a strong feeling of pessimism about a future under
Chinese rule." Nonetheless, for the Chinese leadership, the Basic Law
was seen as a major victory for China, a "creative masterpiece" with
historical and international significance "for the whole of mankind. "92
VIII. THE NATURE OF THE BASIc LAW
The Basic Law" is an unusual document. It has the formidable task
of being the supreme law in Hong Kong, and yet it is subordinate to the
PRC Constitution. It is a Chinese socialist legal document" which is
intended to maintain the capitalist way of life in Hong Kong. It purports
to govern the relationship between the PRC and the HK SAR, 95 and all
aspects of life in the SAR for the ifty years after 1997, including the
87. Id. at 21.
88. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 247.
89. The measures introduced include the go-ahead for the enactment of a Bill of Rights
for Hong Kong.
90. Chan, supra note 73, at 28.
91. See The Hong Kong Legislative Council Debate on the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, (Apr. 4, 1990), in THE HONG KONG BASIc LAW:
BLUEPRINT FOR 'STABILITY AND PROSPERITY' UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 223-35
Ming K. Chan & David 3. Clark eds., 1991).
92. Chan, supra note 73, at 28.
93. Basic Law, supra note 4.
94. The language and legal terms were borrowed largely from Chinese statutes.
95. Basic Law, supra note 4, Ch. Hl (relationship between the Central Authorities and
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region).
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economy,"6 the political structure, 97 education, culture, sports, and social
services."
The intended purpose of the Basic Law may be better considered in
light of the general aspirations of the drafters." A commitment to
economic and political stability is strongly and frequently emphasized.
Maintaining a capitalistic economy and implementing a system of law and
government that best facilitates Hong Kong's capitalist dynamic is also
stressed."°  Furthermore, sustaining a significant degree of political
autonomy is recognized as an important aspect of Hong Kong's continued
success. 101
In the study of the Basic Law, many scholars have referred to it as a
"mini-constitution" for the HK SAR. 1° However, this designation can be
misleading. A brief comparison with the United States Constitution points
out significant gaps in the Basic Law. In his treatise on the American
Constitution and the Bill of Rights,"°' Judge Learned Hand begins with the
premise that all political power emanates from the people and that the
Constitution gains its legitimacy from the people. 1°4 The Basic Law, on
the other hand, is imposed on the people of Hong Kong without their
choice or consensus. 10° It is hard to argue that it contains the aspirations
of the people condensed in written form. Secondly, although the Basic
Law states that it is supreme law, it does not have the force of supreme
law and is legitimate only by virtue of the PRC Constitution, which is
itself easily amended." ° "[The Basic Law] is an NPC law which can
extend or restrict the application of the Chinese legal system as the NPC
96. See generally id. at Cb.V (Economy).
97. See generally id. at Ch. IV (Political Structure).
98. See generally id. at Ch. VI (Education, Science, Culture, Sports, Religion, Labour
and Social Services.)
99. Davis, supra note 72, at 4, 5.
100. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at Annex I, Art. VI.
101. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 3(2).
102. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Post-1997 Hong Kong: A Comparative Study of
the Meaning of 'High Degree of Autonomy", 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41 (1989).
103. LEARNED HAND, THI BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
104. JoHN H. GARVEY & T. ALEXANDER ALEINUCOFF, MODERN CONSTrrUTIONAL
THEoRY: A READER 2 (2d ed., 1991).
105. Id.
106. See generally Hisin-Cbi Kuan, Odnese Constitutional Practice, in THE BAsic LAW
AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 55 (Albert Chen & Peter Wesley-Smith eds., 1988).
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sees fit. Like any NPC law, the Basic Law cannot bind its successors,
and thus, it can be amended or repealed at any time."107
IX. THE BASIc LAw: CONFICTS W THE PRC CONSTUnTON
The Basic Law is, in essence, a statute of the PRC. ' 8 Legitimacy
flows from the PRC Constitution. ' To predict the effectiveness and
strength of the Basic Law in performing its objectives, its inherent
conflicts with the PRC Constitution and possible resolutions of these
conflicts must be examined.
There are fundamental differences in the perspectives that each side
takes,110 despite the fact that both China and the people of Hong Kong
share a common interest in seeing Hong Kong succeed after 1997. This
issue is especially relevant because the interpretation of the Basic Law will
undoubtedly be determined by Chinese socialist principles."1' If left
unreconciled, these differences could upset the delicate balance upon
which Hong Kong is built.
112
A. Capitalism Within Socialism: One Country, Two Systems
The dichotomy between a socialist and capitalist system is, of course,
the most striking feature of the imminent re-union. The PRC Constitution
clearly states that "the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to
... follow the socialist road.""'3 The idea of "one country, two
systems," however, is to allow Hong Kong's capitalistic, social and
economic systems to remain unchanged.114 The two systems are expected
to co-exist in the same country. The PRC Constitution itself shows
internal contradictions. An examination of the following articles of the
PRC Constitution brings out the intenal conflict of the PRC Constitution
in allowing the co-existence of the capitalist and the socialist systems in
China. The Preamble states: "This Constitution affirms the achievements
of the struggles of the Chinese people of all nationalities and defines the
107. Epstein, supra note 35, at 56.
108. Cheng, supra note 62, at 66-67.
109. See generally Davis, supra note 72, at 4-7.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 6.
113. PRC CONSTrITION, supra note 32, at Preamble.
114. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 3(5).
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basic system and basic tasks of the state in legal form; it is the
fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority."I s
(emphasis added).
Article 1 states, "The People's Republic of China is a socialist state
under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and
based on the alliance of workers and peasants."11 6 (emphasis added).
Article 5 states, "The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the
socialist legal system. No law or administrative or local rules shall
contravene the Constitution. "117 (emphasis added).
Article 6 states, "The basis of the socialist economic system of the
People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of
production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective
ownership by the working people."
118
However, Article 31 provides that: "The State may establish special
administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in
special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the
National People's Congress in light of the specific conditions."" 9
(emphasis added)
This conflict troubled both Chinese and Hong Kong scholars during
the drafting of the Basic Law."' The Basic Law expressly excludes the
socialist system and policies from Hong Kong, and by implication, also
excludes those constitutional provisions which impose a socialist system.
The question is how the Basic Law can exclude provisions in the very
Constitution under which it is promulgated without self-contradiction."'
Hong Kong scholars, afraid that the guarantee of a capitalist system might
be a violation of the PRC Constitution, suggested the revision of Article
31.11 However, the PRC leadership was unwilling to amend its
constitution," especially since it had only been recently adopted." The
115. PRC CoNsTrrwrioN, supra note 32, at Preamble.
116. Id. art. 1.
117. Id. art. 5.
118. Id. art. 6.
119. Id. art. 31.
120. Cheng, supra note 62, at 68.
121. Chang, supra note 35, at 108.
122. Cheng, supra note 62, at 69; see also Xanfa Xiugai, 7iyi ji Jibenfa Dagang
(Cao'an) (Proposal on the Revision of the Constitution and a Draft Outline of the Basic
Law) May 1984 (the position paper of Meeting Point, a HK political group).
123. Cheng, supra note 62, at 68; Shao Tianren, co-convener of the Sub-group on the
Relationship between the Central Government and the SAR of the Basic Law Drafting
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PRC leadership was aware that some reassurances were necessary.12
Chinese scholars and government officials set out to provide justifications
for the co-existence of the two systems.'2 These experts attempted to
explain the role of Hong Kong in the future of socialist China by offering
a theoretical explanation in terms of socialist ideology to justify the policy
of "one country, two systems" within the PRC Constitution.
The Chinese, while experimenting with various modes of capitalist
production"2 within their economic structure, still adamantly adhere to the
socialist scheme.1 2 However, current thinking has come to view socialism
"as a fairly long historical stage [and] in this historical stage, there is a
process in which the capitalist and the socialist systems co-exist." 12
According to the prevailing party line of the CCP,113 China is now passing
through the stage of "early socialism," which is estimated to last another
sixty years."' The principal task of the Four Modernizations (i.e.,
agriculture, industry, national defense and science) is better served by
multiple tiers and modes of economy. The CCP therefore accepts that the
doctrine of socialism allows the co-existence of various economic forms
so as to develop socialist productivity.) 2
Committee, indicated after a May-June 1986 meeting of the sub-group that any proposal
to amend the PRC Constitution would not be accepted. It was suggested that the refusal
to amend the Constitution is largely related to "saving face" because amendment would
mean that the Joint Declaration was in violation of the Constitution as it stood. Id. at 71.
124. Chang, supra note 35, at 103; see also Cheng, supra note 62, at 68 (the current
PRC Constitution, adopted in 1982, is the PRC's fourth; the three previous PRC
Constitutions were adopted in 1954, 1975 and 1978, respectively).
125. Id.
126. Cheng, supra note 62, at 68; see also Chang, supra note 35, at 103.
127. These include limited private ownership and the Special Economic Zones. For
an account of China's economic developments, see L. Hongui, Developments in the
Reform of China's Banking and Financial System, 2 J. CHINFSE L. 324 (1988).
128. Cheng, supra note 62, at 68-69.
129. Id. at 69 (containing a statement by Huan Xiang, advisor to the Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, that China would have
three tiers of economic forms: the reforming socialist economy, the special economic zone
economy; and the specific capitalist economy).
130. Chang, supra note 35, at 102 (the prevailing political line, introduced in the Third
Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee in December 1978, was confirmed
and reinforced by the 13th National Party Congress of the CCP held in October-November
1987).
131. Id.; see generally Nigel Rosser & Anna Fenton, Hurd Urged to Renegotiate
Appeal Court, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 1987, at 20.
132. Cheng, supra note 62, at 70.
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Although the Chinese have been willing to re-examine their socialist
doctrines to justify the re-union, their explanation brings out the inherent
danger and fragility of any guarantees since it means that Hong Kong is
allowed to remain unchanged only because of current policies. 3' There
are no long-term, unchangeable guarantees. The Chinese leadership, it
would appear, views the HK SAR's political system as being of a
temporary and ad hoc nature, and not protected by the Constitution." In
the short history of the PRC, there have been many violent upheavals
because of changes in party lines.
135
Under the current Party line, Hong Kong's capitalist productive forces
are seen as a useful tool in reforming China's economy during the "early
stage of socialism."' 36 This explanation must mean that a capitalist Hong
Kong is allowed to exist only for a limited period of time, which will end
when the CCP finds China to be ready to enter a second stage. 13 7 At a
meeting with the BLDC in April 1987,"3 Deng Xiaopeng said that, under
the policy of "one country, two systems," Hong Kong would not change
for fifty years after 1997 and added that there would be no need for it to
change for even an additional another fifty years. 139 Deng's statement
caused little joy in Hong Kong; instead the local community was uneasy
with the fact that a simple statement from the leader could easily alter
what had been promised by an international agreement after two years of
negotiations.' 40
133. Id. at 73.
134. Id. at 75.
135. Kuan, supra note 106, at 60-61.
136. Id. at 64.
137. This prediction may be why Hong Kong will be allowed to remain unchanged for
fifty years after 1997. The time period is roughly equal to current predictions of the
length of the early stage of socialism. See Deng Says "Problems in History' Not to
Dictate Personal Selection, BBC SuMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 18, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
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B. Shortcomings of the Basic Law
1. Contrasting Views of Rights and Duties
For Hong Kong to continue to succeed, the rights and freedoms
currently enjoyed by the populace need to be preserved.1 41 Although the
rights and freedoms of Chinese citizens are said to be protected under the
PRC Constitution, 42 violations of these rights are prevalent in China. 43
One possible explanation is that the Chinese socialist view of the rights of
its citizens differs markedly from the Anglo-American viewpoint. 1 A
fundamental tension exists between liberal conception of natural rights and
a contingent, policy-based conception of rights. 145 In the socialist view,
an individual's rights are dependent on the performance of his imposed
duties. 1" In contrast to the notion of natural rights of Western liberalism,
the rights of the individual under a socialist regime are more easily
surrendered to the prevailing governmental policy or the collective
interest.' 41
This tension seems to have been resolved largely in favor of the
Chinese approach, 1" and it would appear that the liberal notion of rights
141. While this view is certainly held by the Hong Kong people (and the author), it
is necessarily true for the Chinese leadership as well. It has already been discussed that
the primary goal of all parties involved in the re-unification is to ensure the economic
success of Hong Kong. All the parties agree that the local populace must be able to enjoy
essentially the same level of freedom for the continued success. The Chinese leadership,
therefore, is willing to allow Hong Kong to enjoy this freedom as long as it does not
interfere with the Mainland.
142. See generally Kuan, supra note 106, at 60-61.
143. hl (During the Cultural Revolution in China, it was reported that about one
million people were killed, twenty million people were arrested for "counter-
revolutionary" crimes, and 100 million people suffered politically. Today, many
violations are still reported regularly by the press and Amnesty International).
144. Davis, supra note 71, at 135 (attention to Western notions of fundamental rights
is considered to be an important part of Hong Kong's success).
145. Michael C. Davis, Anglo-American Constitutionalism with Oinese
Oiaracterisdcs, 36 AM. J. CoM,. L. 761, 772 (1988).
146. PRC CONSTrrtTioN, supra note 32, at ch. 2, art. 33, 3 ("Every citizen enjoys
the rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and
the law.").
147. Davis, supra note 71, at 135.
148. Chan, supra note 45, at 198 (The restriction on the number of working groups
a BLDC member could join (2) resulted in a small number of members for the sub-group
1994]
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may be endangered in post-1997 Hong Kong. The title and language of
Chapter 3 of the Basic Law, "Fundamental Rights and Duties of the
Residents," is directly borrowed from the PRC Constitution.149 The only
explicit obligation requires Hong Kong residents and other persons in the
Region to "abide by the laws in force" in the SAR.15- This Charter, by
Western notions, seems to state the obvious and does not impose any real
obligations. Nonetheless, the Chinese members of the BLDC demanded
its inclusion. 1 ' As the PRC notion of granting rights subject to the state
or collective interest appears to have been transplanted into the Basic
law, 152 it warrants a brief examination.
2. Chinese Socialist Rights
The Chinese socialist rights doctrine, as embodied in the PRC
Constitution, has several distinguishing features. One distinguishing
feature is that rights are juxtaposed with duties. 5 3 Furthermore, rights are
not inherent as under Western liberalism,"' but are created by the state."
Accordingly, instead of being a limitation on the actions of the
government,"' rights generally take the form of positively worded express
grants.157  These provisions may be expressed as: (1) "citizens
enjoy . . .";5s (2) "citizens have the right to . . .;19 (3) "are protected
by law"; 1"° or (4) "the PRC protects." 161 Political rights are more
on fundamental rights and duties of Hong Kong residents. Of the group, there was only
one member, Simon Li, a retired judge of the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong, who had
expertise in the common law. This lack of expertise was an added push for the BLDC
to adopt the Chinese model.).
149. Id. at 199. Compare PRC CoNsTrrTrnoN, supra note 32, at ch. 2 with Basic
Law, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
150. Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 42.
151. Chan, supra note 45, at 199.
152. Davis, supra note 146, at 775.
153. Davis, supra note 146, at 772-73. See also Kuan, supra note 106, at 59.
154. Jayawickrama, supra note 39.
155. Davis, supra note 146, at 773.
156. Id. at 774 (maintaining that American notion of rights, rights are often expressed
as a negative limitation on the government, e.g. "Congress shall pass no law...").
157. PRC CONSTrruTION, supra note 32, at art. 35.
158. Id. ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech...
159. Id. art. 41 ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to criticize
and make suggestions to any state organ...").
160. Id. art. 40 ("The freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the
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restricted. Citizens are given freedom of speech and demonstration, 6 2
provided that in exercising their freedoms they do not "infringe upon the
interests of the State, of society ...or upon the lawful freedoms and
rights of other persons." 63 (emphasis added) In other words, the interests
of the state are seen as paramount. This justification grants the Chinese
leadership enormous powers that it can use in suppressing the rights of its
citizens.
3. Can the Tiananmen Square Massacre Happen in Hong Kong?
The Chinese leadership has generally not relied on the PRC
Constitution to explain or justify acts that violate the rights of its citizens
to the international community." The Chinese government usually
refuses to acknowledge that any violations took place. 165 The most notable
example would be the Tiananmen Square massacre,"' in which there were
as many as 20,000 casualties. 7 Chinese officials denied the killings and
have instead attempted to re-write the history of the event. I" Nonetheless,
"in Chinese communist theory, law is party policy made perfect in legal
form."69 The Constitution, in order to be legitimate, must inevitably
conform to party policies. Studying the written constitution can help to
shed light on unwritten party policies. It appears that, at least
theoretically, justifications for the massacre can be found in the PRC
People's Republic of China are protected by law.").
161. Id. art. 50 ("The People's Republic of China protects the legitimate rights and
interests of Chinese nationals residing abroad ...
162. Id. art. 39.
163. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 250. See PRC CONSTrruTION, supra note 32,
at art. 51 ("The exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their freedoms
and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the collective,
or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.").
164. Right Report Provides Democrats More Ammunition to Denounce Peking, Cent.
News Agency, Feb. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, CENEWS File.
165. See, e.g., NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw (NBC television broadcast, Nov.
14, 1991) (Chinese officials tried to cover up the fact that forced prison labour was used
in the manufacturing of goods exported to the US.).
166. See generally Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 246 (giving a brief account of the
massacre).
167. Jill Smolowe, Deng's Big Lie: The Hard-Liners Rewrite History to Justify Arrests
and Bury Democracy, TnME, June 26, 1989, at 32.
168. Id.
169. Chang, supra note 33, at 108-9; see also Kuan, supra note 106, at 58.
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Constitution."17 An examination of the text of the Basic Law shows many
parallels.
Many people questioned the worth of the Basic Law after the June 4
massacre, saying that it was "not worth the paper it was written on" 71 if
the Chinese would not honor its obligations. The truth of the matter is:
the Basic Law gives the Chinese leadership so much power that it may be
possible to honor the Law to the letter and still allow the same atrocities
which occurred in the massacre and its aftermath. In the worst-case
scenario, the ingredients may already be present in the Basic Law itself.'1
A short theoretical excursion is warranted because the same tensions are
present in the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. These sources of
potential conflict are those that most threaten the relationship between
Hong Kong and the PRC government."
In Chapter I: General Principles, "[t]he National People's Congress
authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a
high degree of autonomy.., in accordance with the provisions of the
Law."74 (emphasis added). A high degree of autonomy also means
limited autonomy. Nowhere is the extent of the autonomy defined in the
Basic Law. In Article 18 that "[n]ational laws shall not be applied in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex
i1175... [which] shall be confined to those relating to defense and foreign
affairs as well as other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of the
Region as specified by this Law ... "17 (emphasis added). Also, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has the power to
decide "by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special Administrative
region which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the
control of the government of the Region ... that the Region is in a state
of emergency"" (emphasis added). In such an event, the Central
Government "may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in the
Region. "178 Furthermore, the power of interpretation of the Basic Law is
170. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 251.
171. Wacks, supra note 4, at 7.
172. Nichols Bethell, Parting Shot: D-Day Looms over Hong Kong's Big D, THE
DAiLY TELEGRAPH, July 10, 1992.
173. See supra note 73.
174. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 2.
175. Basic Law, supra note 4, at Annex I.
176. Id. art. 18.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also David J. Clark, The Basic Law; One Docwment, Two Systems, in
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to be vested in the Standing Committee of the PRC National People's
Congress. 17 9 The Chinese leadership would seem to have the power to
take any matter into its own hands by declaring that it is outside the scope
of Hong Kong's autonomy.
A particularly volatile provision is Article 14, which provides that
"[tihe Central People's Government shall be responsible for the defense
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."" ° (emphasis added).
The Chinese have demanded that military forces be stationed in the HK
SAR, but "shall not interfere in the local affairs of the Region."
181
(emphasis added). Again, what will be considered "local matters" is not
explicitly defined. Together with Article 18, this provision would give the
Chinese leadership both the military muscle and the legal justification to
order a military crackdown should the situation arise.
Furthermore, the Basic Law mandates that the SAR "shall enact laws
on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion
against the Central People's Government.... "1s2 This provision, along
with the veto power of the Standing Committee," may, as in the PRC,
permit the death sentence"' for "counter-revolutionary" crimes."5
THE HONG KONG BASIc LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILrYy AND PROSPERITY" UNDER
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 36, 44 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991).
179. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 158.
180. Hong Kong Talks Fail to Reach Consensus on Basic Law Clauses on "Turmoil",
BBC SuMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 24, 1989, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BBCSWB File.
181. Id. art. 14.
182. Id. art. 23.
183. Id. art. 17.
Laws enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region must be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress for the record. The reporting for record shall not affect the entry
into force of such laws. If the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress, after consulting the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region under it, considers that any law enacted by the
legislature of the Region is not in conformity with the provisions of this Law
regarding the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, the
Standing Committee may return the law in question but shall not amend it.
Any law returned... shall immediately be invalidated... [but] shall not
have retroactive effect...."
Id.
184. Dullea Bowie, supra note 11, at 252 (discussing how many "counter-
revolutionary" crimes in the PRC carry the death penalty).
185. See generally Andrew Scobell, Strung Up or Shot Down? The Death Penalty in
19941
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Chapter III provides for the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of the
Residents."' Hong Kong residents "shall have freedom of speech, of the
press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of
procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and
join trade unions, and to strike."I" The rights and freedoms are protected
"in accordance with law.'a8' "The freedom of the person of Hong Kong
residents shall be inviolable . . . land they shall not be] subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or imprisonment. . . . [tlorture
... or arbitrary or unlawfid deprivation of the life of any resident shall
be prohibited."189 The concept of protection in accordance with law is a
dangerous one, since fundamental rights and freedoms are then left to the
legislature. There would be no restrictions on the enactment of draconian
laws anywhere in the Basic Law.'" The rights of Hong Kong residents
are indeed set out, but there is simply nothing to stop them from being
amended out of existence post-1997 or at least from becoming highly
restricted. Like the power of veto, the power of amendment to the Basic
Law is vested in the Standing Committee of the PRC. As already
discussed, the rights of citizens are considered to be inferior to the
interests of the state, which include preserving the unity of the nation. 91
The Chinese leadership had labelled the open criticism and denouncement
of the Tiananmen Square massacre by "Hong Kong citizens as being
counter-revolutionary" and "subverting the unity of the nation."" 2 China
has stressed on many occasions that it will not tolerate such actions. 93 It
seems entirely possible that rights such as freedom of speech and freedom
of the press would become more restricted post-199 7 , especially with
regard to criticisms of the Chinese leadership.
Finally, the Basic Law provides that "[t]he Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall be vested with independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication. The courts... shall have jurisdiction
Hong Kong and O'na and Implications for Post-1997, 20 CASE W. RES. I. INT'L L. 147,
148-49 (1988).
186. See supra note 45.
187. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 27.
188. See, e.g., id. art. 26.
189. Id. art. 28.
190. Chan, supra note 45, at 208.
191. PRC CONSTrrUTioN, supra note 32, at art. 4.
192. Government Statemeit Blames Counter-Revolutionaries, UPI, June 4, 1989,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
193. See generally id.
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over all cases in the Region, except ... over acts of state such as defense
and foreign affairs"'" (emphasis added). Jurisdiction of the courts could
be limited by an arbitrary declaration by the PRC leadership that a
particular case falls under an act of state. The people of Hong Kong
would then be left without any effective remedy in the courts should their
rights be violated.
In light of the perceived weaknesses of the Basic Law in protecting
the liberties of the Hong Kong people, further protection was deemed
necessary in the form of a Bill of Rights for the SAR.195
X. THE BILL OF RIGHTS FOR HONG KONG
A. The Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Letters Patent
Hong Kong was unique in the British Commonwealth in that it was
the only territory with a substantial population that still relied on the
common law alone for the protection of its liberties.'"% All other
territories have turned to alternate methods for securing their rights and
freedoms-a justiciable bill of rights. A bill of rights is a statement of
precisely defined rights usually embodied in a constitutional instrument. 97
As a result, the people of Hong Kong are generally not knowledgeable
about their own rights.193
Although the Hong Kong SAR, under the Basic Law, will retain its
common law legal system, it is apparent that the Law is capable of taking
on completely different meanings under Chinese interpretation. Article 39
of the Basic Law states that "Itihe provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights... as applied to Hong Kong shall
remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region." '9 (emphasis added). Nonetheless,
194. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 19.
195. Chan, supra note 73, at 20 (The British government was quick to acknowledge
the existence of a serious crisis of confidence in Hong Kong after the Tiananmen Square
massacre. It decided to introduce three measures to restore local confidence: (i) to speed
up the pace of democratization before 1997; (ii) to enact a Bill of Rights for Hong Kong;
and (ii) to offer UK citizenship as a form of insurance to a very limited number of Hong
Kong residents in the business community to encourage them to stay).
196. Jayawickrama, supra note 46, at 148.
197. Id.
198. Jayawickrama, supra note 39, at 64.
199. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 39.
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the Basic Law itself does not provide objective standards, principles, or
concepts of human rights and fundamental freedoms to which the laws of
the SAR must conform. 2 A catalog of objective rights are crucial in
helping to develop a body of human rights case law for Hong Kong. The
ICCPR is only an external guideline and does not impose any real
obligations. 2°1 In this way, the rights and freedoms provided in the Basic
Law are neither directly enforceable nor justiciable by the courts of law.' °
The ICCPR, as applicable to Hong Kong, does not include the right
of individual petition. The United Kingdom did not ratify the Optional
Protocol to the Covenant, and therefore the inhabitants of Hong Kong do
not have the right of individual petition to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee. 23 In such an instance, one of the primary obligations
of the state party to the Covenant is to provide an enforceable remedy
within the domestic legal system, since the ICCPR requires that a remedy
be available whenever a right or freedom "as herein recognized" is
violated.' However, in the years since ratifying the ICCPR, the British
government has not provided such a remedy for Hong Kong.' °s
Hong Kong scholars and members of the bar have urged the local
legislature to enact an enforceable Bill of Rights since the publication of
the Draft Basic Law. However, the idea of a Bill of Rights was not
warmly received by the legislature or the British government, which
viewed it as being redundant to the Basic Law.2  Following the
Tiananmen Square Massacre, attitudes and policies changed dramatically.
In light of the atrocities committed in Beijing, a Bill of Rights is seen as
crucial to protect the rights of the populace and to maintain their
confidence in Hong Kong.2w
200. Jayawickrama, supra note 39, at 65-66.
201. See id. at 66. (Simon i, chairman of the sub-committee that drafted the chapter
on fundamental rights, argued that incorporating the ICCPR into the Basic Law would
make it too long and cumbersome, and Lu Ping, Deputy Secretary General of the BLDC,
said that "international instruments should not be mixed in with the Basic Law which is
a Chinese Law.").
202. Id.
203. Jayawickrama, supra note 42, at 153 (A state party to the Optional Protocol
recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider
complaints from individuals who claim to be victims of a violation by that state party of
any right set out in the ICCPR.). Id. at 153 n.26.
204. Id. at 159.
205. See supra note 54.
206. For an account of the discussions held, see Jayawickrama, supra note 39, at 66,
69.
207. Id. at 71-72. (In the House of Commons, the Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey
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The Chinese leadership was strongly opposed to the enactment and
entrenchment of a Bill of Rights."' In its view, any law which claimed
a superior status to other laws would be incompatible with the Basic
Lawl and will not be allowed to remain after the transition.2"' Finally,
due to pressure from the Mainland, when the Bill of Rights came into
operation on June 8, 1991, it did so through an ordinary enactment of an
ordinance of the local legislature.21 Without entrenchment to give it
supremacy over all other laws, the Bill appeared to be vulnerable to
amendment or repeal, either expressly or by implication, by subsequent
law.
212
However, some scholars have offered the view that the Bill is indeed
entrenched.2" On the day the Bill of Rights Ordinance was enacted, the
Letters Patent (the principal constitutional instrument of the Crown
Colony) was also amended to finally include the ICCPR, years after it had
been applicable to Hong Kong.21 4 The amendment, which was given little
publicity at the time, provided:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 16 December 1966, as applied to Hong Kong, shall
be implemented through the laws of Hong Kong. No law of
Hong Kong shall be made . . . that restricts the rights and
freedoms enjoyed in Hong Kong in a manner which is
inconsistent with the Covenant as applied to Hong Kong.21 5
Howe announced that a Bill of Rights 'entrenching the essential freedoms of the people
of Hong Kong will be introduced as soon as possible. It will form part of the existing law
and be able to continue after the transfer of sovereignty.' In Hong Kong, the Governor,
Sir David Wilson, announced the Government's intention to enact a Bill of Rights on
October 11, 1989.).
208. Graham Hutchings & Hugo Gurdon, China Threat to Colony's Bill of Rights,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 7, 1991, at 10; Jonathan Braude, China Threat to Overrule
Hong Kong Rights Bill, THE Tams (London), June 7, 1991.
209. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 11 ("No law enacted by the legislature of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall contravene this Law.").
210. Jayawickrama, supra note 39, at 74.
211. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance No. 59 (June 6, 1991).
212. Jayawickrama, supra note 39, at 75.
213. ProposedLegislation 'Secures Bailfor Criminal Defendants', S. CHINA MoRNING
POST, July 9, 1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
214. Braude, supra note 208.
215. The Hong Kong Letters Patent 1991 (No.2), Art. VII(3), reprinted in THE
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Although this amendment makes no mention of the Bill of Rights
Ordinance, its probable effect, is to entrench not only the ICCPR, but the
Bill of Rights as well, 216 because the Bill of Rights is nearly identical to
the ICCPR.21 7 Any law which is inconsistent with the ICCPR would
almost certainly be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.218 Furthermore,
the amendment was modeled on Article 39219 of the Basic Law so as to not
contravene it.22 The amendment does not purport to claim superiority
over the Basic Law.
Nevertheless, the Chinese have remained adamantly opposed to the
Bill, and have vowed to examine it after 1997.221 Only time will tell if
the Bill will endure. For the time being, at least, it has already begun to
serve its purpose. 2 In the short months since its adoption, there has been
a literal explosion in the number of cases brought to challenge the validity
of certain statutes and ordinances in the local courts.'
B. Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: An Expanding Jurisdiction224
The enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and the
accompanying amendment of the Hong Kong Letters Patent have ushered
in a new chapter in the development of Hong Kong's legal system. From
June 8, 1991 forward, all pre-existing Hong Kong legislation-with only
GovERNMEN AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 253 (Norman Miners ed., 1991).
216. See generally Jayawickrama, supra note 39, at 76.
217. id.
218. Id.
219. Compare The Hong Kong Letters Patent, supra note 204, with Basic Law, supra
note 4, at art. 39.
220. See Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 8 ("The laws previously in force in Hong
Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances. . • shall be maintained,
except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.").
221. Hutchings & Gurdon, supra note 210; Braude, supra note 210.
222. See generally Jayawickrama, supra note 37 (the purposes of the Bill of Rights
would include: (a) enabling jurisprudence relating to it to be built up before 1997; (b)
assisting in the education of the public; (c) stimulating the creation of pressure groups to
lobby for the protection of human rights; and (d) aiding in a smooth transition in 1997.).
223. A-G to Appeal Over Bill of Rights Cases, S. CHIWA MORING POST, Oct. 31,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
224. Andrew Byrnes & Johannes M. M. Chan, Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: An
Expanding Jurisdiction, BILL OF RTs. BULL., Oct. 1991, at 1.
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a few exceptions22 -are subject to review against the guarantees contained
in the Bill of Rights.226 This review represents a major expansion of the
role of the Hong Kong courts. 227 Hong Kong courts, prior to the Bill of
Rights, were not enpowered to consider the "constitutionality" of
legislation. Now they are entrusted with the task of determining whether
pre-existing legislation should be repealed because it is inconsistent with
the Bill of Rights.= The courts will also decide whether lgislation
passed subsequent to June 8, 1991 is invalid because of inconsistencies
with the Letters Patent, which now incorporates the standards of the
ICCPR as a limit on the power of the Hong Kong Legislature.t
The Bill of Rights has already begun to have an impact, though only
in a haphazard, patchwork-like manner. There have already been over 40
cases brought in the various levels of the court system230 that hve raised
issues about the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. While Bill of
Rights issues have been raised in some civil cases, the majority of these
cases involved challenges to statutory presumptions in criminal cases.21
Defense lawyers, in a frenzy of activity, have been invoking the Bill
simply as another defense for their clients.? 2 It is up to the judges, who
are largely inexperienced in this area, to sort out the real issues.
Furthermore, a number of these cases were brought in the lower
magistrate courts, where judgments have little value as precedent."
There were, nonetheless, two noteworthy cases brought before the Court
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230. The levels of the Hong Kong court system, from lowest to highest authority are:
Magistrates Courts, District Court, High Court, and Court of Appeal. A final appeal to
the Privy Council in London is also possible, but this will be phased out when the Chinese
takeover in 1997.
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In R v. Sin Yau Ming,' the court ruled that mandatory presumptions
contained in the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance2" were inconsistent with the
guarantee of the presumption of innocence contained in the Bill of
Rights.3 6 If more than 0.5g of heroin was found on the accused, he was
presumed to have possessed it for the purpose of trafficking. The Court
ruled that the prosecution had not demonstrated that the proven fact of a
person's possession of 0.5g of heroin meant that it was more likely than
not that he possessed it for the purpose of trafficking.3 7 The evidence
before the court showed that many drug users who possessed drugs for
personal use could be convicted of the more severe offense of drug
trafficking." 5 As a result, the sections of the Dangerous Drug Ordinance
that were held inconsistent with the Bill of Rights were repealed. 2 9
In Tam Hing-yee v. Wu Tai-wai,' ° the Court of Appeals took a
narrower view of the Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that an ordinance2l'
which permits a judgment creditor to obtain a stop order against a debtor
and prevent the debtor from leaving Hong Kong did not violate the
guarantee of liberty of movement in the Bill of Rights.u 2 Compared with
R v. Sin Yau Ming, the Court used a much less exacting standard in
holding that such a measure was "necessary to protect the rights of
others," namely, judgment creditors.' The Court saw the restriction not
as a question of general liberty or freedom, but rather as one of the
234. Byrnes & Chan, supra note 224, at 2 (HC No. 289 of 1990, 30 Sept. 1991).
235. Id. at 2-3.
236. Id. at2.
237. Id. at 3.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Andrew Byrnes & Johannes M. M. Chan, The Court of Appeal's Decision in Tam
Hing-Yee v. Wu Tai Wai, BiLL OF RTs. BULL., Dec. 1991, at 1.
241. Id.
242. Article 8 of the Bill of Rights provides:
(1) Everyone lawfully within Hong Kong shall, within Hong Kong, have the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
(2) Everyone shall be free to leave Hong Kong (emphasis added).
(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights ecognized in this Bill of Rights.
(4) No one who has right of abode in Hong Kong shall be arbitrarily deprived
of the right to leave Hong Kong.
243. Byrnes & Chan, supra note 224, at 8.
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particular right of the individual to leave Hong Kong if he wished.
"Worth little or much, that right is confirmed to the individual by the [Bill
of Rights] Ordinance which provides that it shall only be taken away or
restricted if that is necessary to achieve one of the stated objectives."
244
(emphasis added) The Court went on to hold that, in view of the ease
with which debtors who wished to evade their responsibilities could flee
to a jurisdiction where a Hong Kong judgment could not be enforced, the
ordinance was a measure necessary for the protection of the rights of
others.245
China is strongly opposed to the proposal that there be more than one
judge from a foreign jurisdiction sitting in the future Court of Final
Appeal of the SAR. 2 " While the Bill of Rights is too recent an enactment
to show consistency in its interpretation, it is from within the court system
of Hong Kong itself that a body of human rights case law must arise.
XI. CONCLUSION
Although it may seem that the upcoming reunification of Hong Kong
and the PRC will be a clash of political systems and ideology, it need not
become a disaster for the people of Hong Kong. What is probably more
reassuring than any promises that the Chinese leadership can offer is the
very practical need for all involved to have the Hong Kong SAR succeed.
China is already exercising its influence in Hong Kong's affairs, even
before the handover in order to gain a secure control come 1997. The
Hong Kong community must be built up into one that is aware of, and
willing to fight for, its fundamental rights. This awareness will give them
a better foundation to resist the tightening grip of the Chinese. The road
the people of Hong Kong should take should not be one of antagonism
with their new rulers. The people of this "one country" must learn to
work with each other. The demands for their rights and freedoms must
be made in a steady, consistent manner. Although the handover is only
a few years away, patience, in the long run, may be the most valuable
asset for the Hong Kong people. Life, after all, goes on after 1997.
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